Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort Claims Act:  Protecting Both Physicians and Claimants by Hart, Bruce, Jr. G.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 5 Article 10 
1990 
Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act: Protecting Both Physicians and Claimants 
Bruce, Jr. G. Hart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce, Jr. G. Hart, Medical Malpractice Protection Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Protecting Both 
Physicians and Claimants, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1107 (1990). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PROTECTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: PROTECTING BOTH-
PHYSICIANS AND CLAIMANTS
INTRODUCTON
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a government is not liable
for the tortious acts of its employees.1 The Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA"), however, provides a limited waiver of the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity.2 It exposes the government to tort liability
only "to the extent that Congress has affimatively waived sovereign im-
munity."3 In section 2680 of the FTCA, Congress set out the circum-
stances in which the government is exempt from liability.4 Under section
2680(k) (the "foreign country exception"), the government is not liable
for torts committed by federal employees in foreign countries.5 The defi-
nition of foreign country includes American military bases on foreign
soil,6 United States embassies7 and occupied territories.8
Over the years, Congress has given special protection to federal em-
1. See Ricco, Developments in Tort Liability of the Federal Government Under The
Federal Tort ClaimsAct, 1987 Annual Survey of Amer. Law 619, 619. The idea that "the
King could do no wrong" was clearly established in English common law at the time of
the colonies' independence from Great Britain. Although the newly independent states
repudiated the political theory of sovereign immunity, the legal doctrine that the govern-
ment is "immune from any suit to which it has not [yet] consented" was incorporated
into the law of the United States. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950); K.
Davis, Constitutional Torts 5-6 (1984). According to the Supreme Court, "without spe-
cific statutory consent, no suit may be brought against the United States." United States
v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); accord United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
587 (1941).
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1982).
3. Davis, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis omitted). "Since no suit may be brought
against the sovereign without its consent," one commentator noted, "a statutory waiver
of immunity is a sine qua non to providing a judicial remedy for tort claims against the
Government. The Tort Claims Act is such a statutory waiver." See 1 L. Jayson, Han-
dling Federal Tort Claims: Administrative and Judicial Remedies, § 66.01 at 3-8 (1989).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1982).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982). Section 2680(k) of the FTCA states that the
FTCA does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." Id. For purposes of
this section, foreign country has been defined as a "territory subject to the sovereignty of
another nation." United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949). If the territory is
under another nation's control, the law of the location where the tort occurs governs the
suit. See 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1982). The government retained its immunity because Con-
gress "was unwilling to subject the United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of
a foreign power." Spelar, 338 U.S. at 221; see also Benderman, Exploring the Foreign
Country Exception: Federal Tort Claims in Antarctica, 21 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 731, 734
(1988) ("Congress intended to bar claims arising under foreign law"); 2 L. Jayson, Han-
dling Federal Tort Claims: Administrative and Judicial Remedies, § 263 at 13-155 ("cov-
erage of the [FTCA] geared toward sovereignty of United States") (emphasis in original).
6. See Spelar, 338 U.S. at 218-19; Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 522 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
7. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964).
8. See Burna v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957).
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ployees, particularly medical personnel9 who, due to the nature of their
jobs, are at a greater risk of being sued for torts committed in the scope
of their employment. Congress enacted several statutes making the
FTCA remedy the exclusive remedy for medical malpractice claimants."0
These statutes preclude civil action against the employee by substituting
the remedy prescribed under the FTCA."1 This Note discusses the effect
of the foreign country exception of the FTCA on malpractice protection
provided by the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act (the "MMIA").12
Under one view, the MMIA makes the remedy under the FTCA ex-
clusive of any other civil action directly against the defendant medical
personnel, even if the plaintiff is later barred from recovering against the
federal government because the government retained its immunity under
the foreign country exception of the FTCA.13 Other opinions have held
9. Congress has given medical personnel a very broad definition, including in it phy-
sicians, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, paramedicals, and other "supporting personnel."
See 10 U.S.C. 1089(a) (1988).
10. Three statutes make the government the sole defendant in malpractice actions
against government medical personnel: the Veterans Administration Medical Malprac-
tice Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-311, 79 Stat. 1157 (codified as. amended at 38 U.S.C.
§ 4116 (1982)); the Public Health Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-623, 84 Stat. 1868
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 233 (1982)); and the Medical Malpractice Immunity
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1988)).
In 1988, with the enactment of the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act (the "FELRTCA"), Congress amended the FTCA to make it the
exclusive remedy for any suit in tort against a federal employee while acting in the scope
of employment. See Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2679 (West 1990)). The purpose of the act is to "provide immunity for Federal employ-
ees from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their
employment." H.R. Rep. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5945. Congress modeled the Act after the malpractice protection
statutes. See id. at 5947. Unfortunately, there is an inconsistency within the Act's legis-
lative history as to its effect on claimant's suits. On the one hand, the report states that
"no one who previously had the right to initiate a lawsuit will lose that right." Id. at
5951. Yet the report also states that "suits against Federal employees are precluded even
where the United States has a defense which prevents an actual recovery." Id. at 5950;
see also Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 654-56 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussion of conflicting
legislative history). Fortunately, because the FELRTCA is plain on its face, courts can
avoid its confusing legislative history. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 656. See generally 2A
N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01 (1984) (discussing Plain Meaning
Rule). Despite the government's argument that the FELRTCA applies to all federal
employees, including medical personnel, the courts that have ruled on both statutes hold
that malpractice suits against medical personnel based on a tort arising in a foreign coun-
try are not affected by the FELRTCA because it is part of the FTCA, and applies only in
situations in which the FTCA applies. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 654-55; Newman v.
Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 970-71 (1Ith Cir. 1989). Thus, the same circumstances that allow
suits to be brought against the individual physician under the MMIA denies those same
physicians protection under the FELRTCA because the FTCA is inapplicable. See infra
notes 49-85 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
12. 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1988). While most of the cases discussed in this Note focus on
the MMIA, the statutory interpretation and subsequent analysis should apply to all four
malpractice protection statutes.
13. See Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987).
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that if the claimant is prevented from pursuing a cause of action under
the FTCA because of the foreign country exception, the exclusive rem-
edy provision of the MMIA does not apply.14 This permits the plaintiff to
bring suit against defendant medical personnel individually." This Note
supports the position that the FrCA acts as the exclusive means of re-
covery for the plaintiff only when it allows a suit against the United
States. When the foreign country exception bars the claimant's cause of
action, she should be allowed to maintain her suit against the medical
personnel individually.
Part I of this Note examines the legislative history and purpose of the
FTCA and MMIA. Part II focuses on the decisions discussing the
MMIA and the foreign country exception. Part HI argues that Congress
intended the MMIA to protect government medical personnel either by
substituting the government as the sole defendant or by providing mal-
practice insurance when the government cannot be sued because the
FTCA does not apply. In either instance, Congress intended to provide a
remedy for legitimate claimants.16 This Note concludes that in enacting
the MMIA, Congress intended the FTCA to be used to protect govern-
ment medical personnel from suit only in cases in which there is a possi-
ble means of recovery against the federal government.
I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY ACT
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
Under the FTCA, Congress gave plaintiffs the option of suing the gov-
ernment rather than the federal employee "where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred."17 As originally
enacted, the FTCA did not bar suits against the federal employee. The
claimant had the option of suing the United States in addition to the
employee, but could only recover from one defendant.18
14. See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1989); Newman v. Soballe,
871 F.2d 969, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740-41 (10th Cir.
1977).
15. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 656; Newman, 871 F.2d at 977-78; Jackson, 557 F.2d at
740-41.
16. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f) (1988).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the only way to
get any relief from the government was the passage of private bills by Congress. See
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950); 1 L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort
Claims: Administrative and Judicial Remedies, §§ 51, 65.01 (1989); Ricco, supra note 1
at 619; Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Conn. Bar J. 224,
224 (1989).
18. See Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The FTCA
states in part that "[t]he judgment in an action [against the United States] shall consti-
tute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." 28
U.S.C. § 2676 (1982); see also S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted
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Many plaintiffs have opted to sue the government because in most in-
stances federal employees do not have the resources to pay large damage
judgments. The United States, on the other hand, is "the world's largest
self insurer" and pays any damage judgment levied against it in suits
brought by private individuals. 9
There are still advantages, however, to suing medical personnel indi-
vidually. For example, the FTCA disallows punitive damage awards
against the government. 20 Moreover, the FTCA-imposed two-year stat-
ute of limitations21 may be shorter than the applicable statute of limita-
tions if the claimant was to sue the medical personnel directly under state
law.' Finally, in malpractice cases, many claimants prefer a jury trial,
especially if the injury might elicit jury sympathy.2" Under the FTCA,
jury trials are unavailable.24 Nevertheless, it appears that in many cases
the advantages of suing the government outweigh the benefits of suing a
physician individually, unless the plaintiff is prevented from proceeding
against the government because of the FTCA's foreign country
exception.2
5
B. Medical Malpractice Immunity Act
Prior to the passage of the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act (the
"M IffA"), 26 if a case fell under one of the exclusion provisions of the
FTCA,27 the claimant had no alternative but to sue the medical person-
nel directly; the FTCA left him without a remedy against the United
States. This situation arose when the alleged malpractice occurred on a
in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4443, 4446 [hereinafter Senate Report 1264]
(recovery against government precludes recovery against individual employee); H.R.
Rep. No. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter House Report 333] (if defendant
is sued individually, neither he nor government can substitute government as defendant
to proceed under FTCA).
19. See House Report 333, supra note 18, at 3; see also Davis, supra note 1, at 26
("governments always pay judgments against them"). One commentator noted that in
addition to relieving Congress of the burden of legislating private bills, judgments provide
an end to the "hardship and injustice" for victims of the government's torts. See 1 L.
Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims § 65.01 at 3-3 to 3-4, (1989).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982). Given the uniquely personal nature of malpractice,
claimants may have both emotional and vindictive reasons for suing the medical person-
nel individually. See Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4446; House Report 333,
supra note 18, at 3. Further, there is a strong financial interest because punitive damages
by definition are a windfall to the claimant. See E. Shoben and W. Tabb, Cases and
Problems on Remedies 661 (1989); see also W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts 9-
11, 14 (1984) (when punitive damages may be awarded against a physician, claimant has
financial interest in suing her personally).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982).
22. See House Report 333, supra note 18, at 3.
23. See Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4446; House Report 333, supra note 18
at 3.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1982).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1982).
26. Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (1976) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1988)).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(n) (1982).
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military base on foreign soil, a type of injury which is excluded under
section 2680(k) of the FTCA.28 Under such circumstances, it was likely
that substantial liability would be imposed on individuals. This, com-
bined with the increase in malpractice suits in the early 1970's,29 had a
deleterious effect on the Defense Department's medical corps. Congress
sought to remedy the situation with the enactment of the MMLA. 30
The purpose of the MMIA is to "meet[] the serious and urgent needs
of defense and medical personnel by protecting them fully from any per-
sonal liability arising out of the performance of their official medical du-
ties."31 In addition to protecting medical personnel against malpractice
liability, the MMIA is intended to provide "adequate compensation for
legitimate malpractice claims."32 The MMIA is designed to protect
medical personnel in most instances by removing the claimant's option to
28. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. In Manemann v. United States, 381
F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1967), the court held that the claimant, who complained of malprac-
tice that occurred in Taiwan, was barred from suing the United States. See id. at 705.
The court relied on the fact that section 1346(b) of the FTCA requires application of the
"law of the place where the act or omission occurred," 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and held
that because Taiwan is a foreign country, the claim fell "within the exclusionary provi-
sion of section 2680(k)." Manemann, 381 F.2d at 705; see also Broadnax v. United States
Army, 710 F.2d 865, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (suit against federal government dismissed
because FTCA is inapplicable to negligent acts committed in foreign country); Rafflery v.
United States, 150 F. Supp. 618, 618 (E.D. La. 1957) (claimant barred from suing United
States on malpractice claim because cause of action arose in Germany).
29. During the period 1963-1968, there were an average of 4.3 malpractice claims
against military medical personnel each year. See Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at
4446. This increased to 63.8 suits per year in the period 1969-1974. See id. During the
first half of 1975 alone there were 63 malpractice claims filed. See id. Moreover, the
Justice Department reported that in 1975, it was involved in over 494 suits arising out of
alleged medical malpractice of officers or employees of the federal government. See
House Report 333, supra note 18, at 3.
Defense medical personnel soon found it almost impossible to obtain their own mal-
practice insurance, and when available, it was extraordinarily expensive. See Senate Re-
port 1264, supra note 18, at 4447. The cost of self-insuring in 1975 ranged from a low of
$150 to as high as $19,000, depending on the physician's location and specialty. See id at
4448. In contrast, the government predicted that the cost under the Medical Malpractice
Immunity Act would range from $400 to $800 per year per physician. See id. at 4448.
Indeed, malpractice insurance had become so expensive that many medical personnel
simply went without coverage. In 1975, at the time of the House report, there were
twenty malpractice lawsuits involving 37 defense department employees. See House Re-
port 333, supra note 18, at 3. The total amount of the claims exceeded $13,700,000. See
id. Yet, in all but three of the suits there was no insurance coverage, and of those that
involved insurance, the limitations on liability fell well below the claimed damages. See
id. Congress feared that the surge in malpractice litigation would result in defense medi-
cal personnel practicing "defensive medicine" by making decisions based on "the best
interest of the physician rather than the patient." Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at
4447; see also House Report 333, supra note 18, at 3 (tort liability encourages practice of
"defensive medicine"); Davis, supra note 1, at 24-25 (same). Congress also realized that
physicians might reject supervisory roles for fear of the added liability that such positions
entail. See Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4447.
30. 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1988).
31. Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4444.
32. Id. at 4445.
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sue the physician individually.33 The statute also provides that the rem-
edy against the government under the FTCA, when available, shall be
the exclusive remedy for malpractice suits.34
Upon the Attorney General's certification that defendants were acting
within the scope of their employment, the MMIA permits35 the Attorney
General to remove lawsuits from state to federal courts36 and substitute
the United States as the defendant in the actions, with all provisions of
the FTCA applying.37
In addition to making the FTCA the vehicle for medical malpractice
actions, the MMIA also protects defense medical personnel in situations
in which the FTCA does not apply.38 The MMIA states that if a remedy
against the United States is not available the case is to be remanded to
state court.3 9 Section 1089(f) of the MMIA permits the head of the
agency concerned to "hold harmless or provide liability insurance" to
defense medical personnel acting in the scope of their duties while as-
signed to a foreign country, or working for a non-federal "department,
agency or instrumentality," or if the circumstances are "likely to pre-
clude the remedies of third persons against the United States" under the
FTCA. o
33. See Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
34. See House Report 333, supra note 18, at 2. Section 1089(a) of the MMIA states:
The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of
title 28 for damages for personal injury, including death, caused by the negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission of any physician... of the armed forces, the
National Guard .... or the Central Intelligence Agency... while acting within
the scope of his duties... shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against such physician...
whose act or omission gave rise to such action or proceeding.
10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1988).
35. At least one branch of the armed forces has made the indemnification of all per-
sonnel not covered by the FTCA mandatory. See Newman v. SobalIe, 871 F.2d 969, 977
(11th Cir. 1989) (quoting SECNAV Instruction 6300.3, JAG: 14C (March 14, 1978).
36. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(c) (1988).
37. See id. As one commentator noted:
The essence of this procedure is that the Attorney General would defend any
civil action against a physician, dentist, or nurse arising out of his employment.
If successful, this would end the matter. However, if the Government should
lose the case and a claim be approved by the courts in favor of the plaintiff, the
Government would bear the cost of meeting the claim.
1 L. Jayson, Personal Injury: Handling Federal Tort Claims § 175.04 at 6-57 (1978).
38. See Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4451.
39. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(c) (1988). Section 1089(c) of the MMIA states:
"Should a United States district court determine on a hearing on a motion to
remand held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed is one in
which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section is
not available against the United States, the case shall be remanded to the State
court."
Id. The "remedy" within the meaning of subsection (a) is provided in sections 1346(b)
and 2672 of the FTCA. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1988).
40. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f) (1988). For example, assume that a military physician is
charged with malpractice in the course of his employment. If the tort is committed
within the United States, there is no controversy because, when combined, sections
1112 [Vol. 58
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The legislative history and plain language of the MMIA combine to
show Congress' dual purpose in enacting the statute: to protect defense
medical personnel from the perils of malpractice litigation and to ensure
worthy claimants of adequate compensation. There is confusion, how-
ever, over the application of the MMIA in situations where the United
States is excluded from liability by section 2680 of the FTCA.
II. APPROACHES TO APPLICATION OF THE MMIA IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE FOREIGN COUNTRY EXCEPTION OF THE FrCA
The Ninth4 and Eleventh 42 Circuits have held that, because the
FTCA is inapplicable by its own terms to suits arising in foreign coun-
tries, the physician remains liable for any damages awarded in such a
suit.4 3 These decisions hold that when the foreign country exception
makes the FTCA inapplicable, district courts have no jurisdiction to re-
move cases from state court under section 1089(c)l of the MMIA, and
cannot substitute the United States as the proper party defendant.45
Although physicians remain liable for malpractice, they are spared any
financial loss by the insurance or indemnification provided under section
1089(f) of the MIA.4
1089(a) of the MMIA and 1346(b) of the FTCA substitute the United States as the de-
fendant in any suit against the physician, with the claimant's "exclusive" remedy coming
under the FTCA. Unlike his stateside colleagues, however, a physician who is charged
with malpractice in England or Germany is not so clearly covered by the NMIA because
the United States cannot be sued for his tort under the FTCA. See supra notes 5-8 and
accompanying text.
41. See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 653-54 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. See Newman v. Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 970 (11th Cir. 1989).
43. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 655; Newman, 871 F.2d at 972-73. In Newman, the
court noted that the legislative history of the MMIA demonstrates that "the immunity
conferred by the 'exclusive remedy' language of subsection (a) was limited to the reach of
the FTCA and that where the FTCA did not extend, military physicians would continue
to be susceptible to personal suit and would be liable for malpractice judgments rendered
against them as individuals." Id. at 972-73. The court reasoned that Congress chose to
protect these individuals with insurance or indemnity under section 1089(f) because "the
FTCA, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), [the foreign country exception] .... did not
extend jurisdiction in their situation." Id. at 973. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
section 1089(f) of the MMIA must cover malpractice suits arising in foreign countries no
matter where they are brought, for applying it only to suits brought in foreign courts
renders the section worthless. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 652-53. This is not entirely
correct, because insurance provided by section 1089(f) is needed in some instances to
protect physicians assigned to private hospitals. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying
text. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 1089 of the MMIA runs counter to
Congressional intent only in that it is unduly narrow. See generally N. Singer, 2A Suth-
erland Statutory Construction § 46.05 (1984) (describing "whole statute" analysis).
Although ultimately reaching the correct conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth
Circuit, has also interpreted section 1089(f) in an unreasonably constricted fashion.
44. See Newman, 871 F.2d at 977-78. In Marshall, the suit was in district court on
account of diversity. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 651.
45. See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 1989); Newman v. Soballe, 871
F.2d 969, 970, 972-73 (1Ith Cir. 1989).
46. See Marshall, 885 F.2d at 653; Newman, 871 F.2d 975-76. The Tenth Circuit has
taken a similar position regarding the purpose of section 1089(f). In Jackson v. Kelly,
1990] 113
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The Fifth Circuit, however, has interpreted section 1089 to render gov-
ernment personnel immune from all medical malpractice actions. Under
this approach, the claimant's exclusive remedy is through the FTCA.47
If the claimant cannot recover against the United States because of the
foreign country exception of the FTCA, the cause of action is dismissed,
leaving the claimant without a judicial remedy.48
I. APPLICATION OF THE MMIA TO MALPRACnCE CLAIMS
ARISING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
A. The Dual Intent of Congress
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits correctly interpret the MMIA in
light of its purpose and legislative history. Both circuits acknowledge
Congress' intent to provide claimants adequate compensation as well as
to protect medical personnel.49 The Fifth Circuit's approach, however, is
based on an erroneous interpretation of the MMIA. In Powers v.
Schultz,5" the Fifth Circuit asserted that the MMIA's legislative history
indicates that Congress intended the statute to afford medical personnel
"'an immunity from civil suit and personal liability for acts of an alleged
medical malpractice .... 1 The court reasoned that allowing the claim-
ant to sue the physician individually "would tend to vitiate this purpose
in most [sic] all medical malpractice cases in which the United States is
immune from suit under the FTCA."' 2 This interpretation, the court
added, could not "be reconciled with the intent and purposes of the Act
to grant... blanket immunity."' 3
557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977), the claimant alleged malpractice by a military physician
stationed at an Air Force hospital in England. See id. at 736. Although the MMIA was
inapplicable because the cause of action accrued before its enactment, the court looked to
it for guidance in reaching its decision. See id. at 740. The court asserted that:
Granting [the physician] official immunity would not only make 10 U.S.C. §
1089(f) superfluous, it would also contravene one of Congress' aims in enacting
section 1089(f) in its present form. Instead of granting military medical person-
nel practicing in foreign countries absolute immunity from suits for acts within
the scope of their employment, Congress elected to have the government pro-
tect them through indemnification or insurance.... [S]ection 1089(f) is pre-
mised on the liability of military medical personnel in the first instance.
Id. at 740-41.
47. See Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1987).
48. See id. at 298. In Powers, the government removed the suit to federal court under
section 1089(c) of the MMIA, and substituted itself for the physician as the proper party
defendant under section 1089(a). See id. at 295-96. The district court granted the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss based on the United States' immunity to suits arising in a
foreign country. See id. The Fifth Circuit's affirmance left the claimant without a rem-
edy at law. See id at 298.
49. See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1989); Newman v. Soballe, 871
F.2d 969, 972-73 (11th Cir. 1989).
50. 821 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1987).
51. Id. at 297 (quoting House Report 333, supra note 18, at 2).
52. Id. at 297.
53. Id.
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Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's finding, a careful examination of the
legislative history of the MMIA reveals that Congress intended to pro-
tect medical personnel, but not at the expense of claimants' right to seek
a judicial remedy. 4 Therefore, the legislative history suggests a different
conclusion from that reached in Powers.
Congress did not select the FTCA as.the scheme of compensation
under the MMIA with the intention to divest potential claimants of their
causes of action. Instead, the FTCA was selected over other proposed
schemes because it was the least costly approach. Moreover, according
to the Supreme Court, legislation does not pursue its purposes "at all
costs. ' 56 Rather, "[d]eciding what competing values will or will not be
sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence
of legislative choice.. . ." ' Legislative intent is frustrated when courts
assume that "whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be
the law."'58 In passing the MMIA, Congress also sought to ensure ade-
quate compensation for legitimate claimants. 59 Powers, by dismissing the
cause of action, ignored this concern.
1. Section 1089(f) of the MMIA Protects Medical Personnel When
the FTCA Does Not Apply
Powers argued that section 1089(f) provides indemnity or insurance to
protect medical personnel only in the event that the malpractice suit is
brought in a foreign country."o Nothing in the legislative history, how-
ever, suggests such an interpretation.61 In fact, both the House and Sen-
ate reports state that section 1089(f) is intended to provide protection
where the FTCA is not applicable.62
54. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
55. Before Congress rendered the FTCA one of the possible solutions for malpractice
actions, it rejected several alternative approaches to malpractice protection. See Senate
Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4447-48. Among those considered were indemnification
programs and special insurance coverage. See id. Congress settled on the FTCA because
"[t]he statutory framework [was] already in place" and it was the "least costly ap-
proach." See id. at 4447. In sum, Congress concluded that "extending protection
through the Federal Tort Claims Act [was] simple, inexpensive, and effective." Id. at
4448.
56. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987).
57. Id. at 526.
58. Id. (emphasis in original).
59. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
60. See Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1987).
61. See Newman v. Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 975 (11th Cir. 1989). Section 1089(f)
merely states that insurance may be provided if "such person is assigned to a foreign
country." 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f) (1988). It does not qualify the applicability of the provi-
sion on where the suit is brought.
62. The Senate report states:
The Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to actions arising in a foreign
country. Also when a medical personnel is assigned to other than a federal
department... he may not be covered under the [FTCA]. Subsection (f) au-
thorizes the appropriate Secretary to provide protection through indemnifica-
tion or insurance to medical personnel in those situations.
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An explanation of other applications of section 1089(f) further under-
mines the Powers reasoning. Section 1089(f) states that it applies when
medical personnel are "detailed for service with other than a Federal
department, agency, or instrumentality."63 This clause protects military
physicians sued for malpractice while working in private hospitals. De-
pending on a particular state's borrowed servant doctrine, these physi-
cians could act within the scope of their duties, yet simultaneously not be
employees of the United States for purposes of respondeat superior."
According to section 1346(b) of the FTCA, the government incurs liabil-
ity only for torts of its employees "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant., 6 Under the
"power of control standard," a master who exercises control over a ser-
vant when the negligent act occurs is liable to the claimant.6 6 Conse-
quently, in the states that employ this standard, physicians working in
private hospitals are liable directly for malpractice because the FTCA
does not apply.6" Section 1089(f) of the MMIA protects the physician
by providing malpractice insurance or indemnifying her under these
circumstances.
Furthermore, section 1089(f) applies to situations that are "likely to
preclude the remedies of third persons against the United States." 68 This
broad language implies that Congress intended that the insurance provi-
sion be flexible enough to cover unique situations that might escape
FTCA coverage.
Thus, a full examination of section 1089(f) demonstrates that Con-
Senate Report 1264, supra note 18, at 4451.
The House report asserts:
[Tihe bill would provide coverage through the Secretary of Defense for certain
circumstances not included within the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
such as incidents arising in a foreign country or possibly in other than a Federal
agency or institution where military or civilian personnel may be assigned.
House Report 333, supra note 18, at 4; see also Smith Y. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 653 (9th
Cir. 1989) (section 1089(f) provides protection where FTCA does not apply); Newman v.
Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 974-75 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735,
740-41 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f) (1988). The legislative history describes such a situation as
military service in a "private" or "civilian" hospital. See Senate Report 1264, supra note
18, at 4451; House Report 333, supra note 18, at 4.
64. Compare Afouso v. City of Boston, 587 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (D. Mass. 1984)
(apply Massachusetts borrowed servant doctrine based on power of control standard,
hospital was master for purposes of respondeat superior) with Green v. United States, 709
F.2d 1158, 1164 (7th Cir. 1983) (under Wisconsin borrowed servant doctrine, United
States remained master for purposes of respondeat superior because it was primary bene-
ficiary of physician's residency).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
66. See generally 1 C. LaBatt, Master and Servant 170-220 (1913) (discussing master-
servant relationship).
67. See Afonso, 587 F. Supp. at 1347.
68. 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f) (1988). Section 1346(b) of the FTCA describes these persons
as those with claims against United States employees for tortious acts committed while in
the scope of their employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
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gress sought to provide medical malpractice insurance for medical per-
sonnel subject to suits under the borrowed-servant doctrine.69 Congress
also intended to offer insurance for suits brought against such personnel
in foreign countries,70 or for any other situation "likely to preclude a
remedy" under the FTCA.7 Moreover, Congress authorized automatic
assumption of liability by the government for medical personnel who are
covered by the FrCA. 2 Therefore, courts should not infer that Con-
gress would fail to provide any coverage at all for claims arising overseas
that are brought in the United States. 3
This misconception about the application of section 1089(f) encour-
ages claimants to file lawsuits in foreign countries, compelling the United
States to pay any judgment against the physician. Ironically, this contra-
dicts Congress' very purpose in enacting the foreign country exception:
to avoid subjecting the United States to "liabilities depending upon the
laws of a foreign power."7 4 Rather, Congress intended section 1089(f) to
cover malpractice actions arising in foreign countries regardless of where
the actions were brought.
2. The FTCA Must Provide a Remedy for Suits Removed
Under the MMIA.
The Powers interpretation of the removal clause in section 1089(c) of
the MMIA is also suspect." Interpreting section 1089(c) with section
1089(a), Powers concluded that, under 1089(c), all that is necessary for
the suit to be removed to the district court is that the alleged negligence
occur while the physician is in the scope of his employment.7 6 Suits
should not be removed under 1089(c), however, unless a remedy against
the United States is available. Powers failed to take into account the ju-
risdictional requirements of section 1346(b) of the FTCA. Indeed, sec-
69. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
73. As one court noted:
[1]t is illogical to think that the United States would be willing to pay out claims
for malpractice suits filed in the United States when the military physician is
stationed stateside, and willing to pay out claims for suits filed in a foreign
country when the physician is stationed overseas, but would be unwilling to pay
out those same claims if filed in the United States when the physician acted
while assigned overseas.
Newman v. Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 977 (1 Ith Cir. 1989).
74. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949). See supra note 5.
75. Section 1089(c) states in part that:
Should a United States district court determine on a hearing on a motion to
remand held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed [from a re-
spective State court] is one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of
[section 1089(a)] is not available against the United States, the case shall be
remanded to the State court.
10 U.S.C. § 1089(c) (1988).
76. See Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987).
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tion 1089(a) qualifies the remedy by suit as one provided by section
1346(b), which in turn is dependent upon the exclusions found in section
2680 of the FTCA.77 When all three sections are considered together, it
is clear that Congress intended the remedy under section 1089(a) of the
MMIA to be not for any tortious cause of action, but only for causes of
action that can be pursued under the FTCA.7s
Powers also erroneously relied on Jones v. Newton 79 as precedent. The
facts in Jones were quite different from those in Powers. In Jones, the
claimant sued the United States under the FTCA and eventually lost the
case on the merits."s Only after the verdict was the claimant denied re-
mand of the case to the state court to proceed against the physician."1
Unlike Powers, the circumstances of the case fell squarely within the re-
quirements of the MMIA because the alleged malpractice occurred in the
United States while the physician was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment.82 The claimant's only recourse was suit against the United
States under the FTCA. 3 Because the claimant lost the case, it was the
end of the matter, and the court properly denied the motion for re-
mand.84 Jones attempted to get a second bite of the proverbial apple by
suing the physician in state court after being defeated in the federal sys-
tem. Moreover, by moving for remand after the adjudication on the mer-
77. See 10 U.S.C. 1089(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1982). In short, according to
the plain wording of the Act, if the plaintiff has no remedy against the United States
under the FTCA, the suit is remanded to the state court.
Section 1346(b) of the FTCA lists who can bring suit against the United States, and
under what conditions. It states, moreover, that any suit within the jurisdiction of the
FTCA is "[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171" of title 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
Chapter 171 of title 28 contains the bulk of the FTCA. Section 2680 of the FTCA, which
contains the exclusions through which Congress maintained sovereign immunity for the
United States, is within Chapter 171. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Consequently, if an exclu-
sion under section 2680 is applicable, there is no remedy to be had under the FTCA. See
i d
78. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680 (1982). Only after
denying remand of the suit to the state court did the Powers court take into account the
provisions of section 2680 by dismissing the cause of action against the United States. See
Powers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987). This violates another basic rule of
statutory interpretation, in that "[s]pecific words within a statute... may not be read in
isolation of the remainder of that section or the entire statutory scheme." Sutton v.
United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1987); accord United States v. Morton, 467
U.S. 822, 828, (Supreme Court does not "construe statutory phrases in isolation", rather,
it "read[s] statutes as a whole").
79. 775 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1985). The Powers court stated that when "there can be
no recovery against the United States, the plaintiff has reached the end of the line." Pow-
ers v. Schultz, 821 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Jones v. Newton, 775 F.2d
1316, 1318 (5th Cir. 1985)).
80. See Jones v. United States, 729 F.2d 326, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1984). The claimant
was the wife of a serviceman who was fatally injured in a motorcycle crash off base in
Texas. See id. at 327.
81. See Jones v. Newton, 775 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1985).
82. See Newman v. Soba~le, 871 F.2d 969, 975 (lth Cir. 1989).
83. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (1988).
84. See Jones v. Newton, 775 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1985); see also supra note
37 and accompanying text (discussing procedure under 1089(c)).
1118 [Vol. 58
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & THE FTCA
its, the claimant violated the plain wording of section 1089(c) of the
MMIA, which requires such a motion to be made "before a trial on the
merits." 85
B. Dismissing a Cause of Action without Providing a Remedy Violates
the Due Process Clause
By dismissing a cause of action without affording the claimant an op-
portunity for a hearing on the merits, Powers ran afoul of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.3 6 The Supreme Court has asserted that a
state tort cause of action is a "species of property" protected by the due
process clause.8 7 Consequently, there are "constitutional limitations
upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to
dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for a hearing
on the merits of his cause."88 This is not an unlimited right, however,
and can only be enforced "if litigation offers the only effective means, if
not the exclusive means, of resolving the dispute at hand."8 9 In other
words, the existence of an effective alternative scheme of recovery pre-
cludes the need for litigation, and eliminates possible due process
problems. 90
In Boddie v. Connecticut,9" the Supreme Court, in waiving the plain-
tiff's filing fee for a divorce action,92 held that because the State controls
the divorce mechanism and no one can be divorced outside of the judici-
ary system, denial of court access excludes the plaintiff "from the only
forum effectively empowered" to grant her a divorce.93 In United States
v. Kras,94 however, the Court upheld a filing fee for bankruptcy on the
grounds that, unlike in Boddie, where litigation is the only means of set-
tling the dispute, "bankruptcy is not the only method available to a
85. See 10 U.S.C. § 1089(o) (1988); see also Newman v. Sobale, 871 F.2d 969, 975
(11th Cir. 1989) (claimant brought suit after trial on merits).
86. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
87. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982). The due process
clause protects "civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hop-
ing to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances." Id. at 429.
88. Societe Internationale, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958); In re Consoli-
dated United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Emerick v. Fenick Ind., 539 F.2d. 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.
1976).
89. Littlewolf v. Hodel, 681 F. Supp. 929, 942 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd 877 F.2d 1058
(D.C. Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (exclusiveness
of court access and remedy is major factor in determining validity of denying cause of
action).
90. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Supreme Court held that
"[the legitimacy of the State's monopoly over techniques of final dispute settlement, even
where some are denied access to its use, stands unimpaired where recognized, effective
alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain". Id. at 375-76.
91. Id.
92. The plaintiff in Boddie could not afford to pay the filing fee because she was indi-
gent. See id. at 372.
93. Id. at 376.
94. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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debtor for the adjustment" of his debts.95 Presumably, he could work
out some type of payment schedule with his creditors.96
Like the plaintiff in Boddie, malpractice claimants who are denied re-
covery under the FTCA do not have another statutory scheme that offers
them compensation. Their only remedy is through the judicial process.
In order to legitimately restrict their access to the courts, the government
must have a "countervailing... interest of overriding significance", be-
cause "having made access to the courts an entitlement or a necessity,
the [government] may not deprive someone of that access unless the bal-
ance of [government] and private interests favors the government
scheme."' 97 Congress has a strong interest in protecting medical person-
nel assigned overseas from malpractice actions.98 This interest, however,
is satisfied by the insurauce protection provided by section 1089(f) of the
MMIA.99 The presence of this less restrictive means tips the balance of
interests in favor of maintaining the cause of action for the claimant.
Consequently, the Powers interpretation of the MMIA violates the claim-
ant's fifth amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
With the MMIA, Congress averted a potential crisis within the medi-
cal ranks of the military. Yet, when courts apply the MMIA to a mal-
practice suit and then dismiss the action because of the foreign country
exception, they act in a manner contrary to the clear intent of Congress
to protect claimants as well as physicians. Under these circumstances,
the claimant should be allowed to bring suit against the defendant medi-
cal personnel, with the latter protected by government-supplied insur-
ance. Only then is the intent of Congress satisfied.
Bruce G. Hart, Jr.
95. See id. at 445.
96. See id.
97. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 n.5 (1982).
98. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
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